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CLASS CERTIFICATION AND CLASS SETTLEMENT:
FINDINGS FROM FEDERAL QUESTION CASES, 2003–2007
Thomas E. Willging* & Emery G. Lee III**

No two cases were alike.1
INTRODUCTION

Securities2 and mass torts3 dominate the class action literature.
But securities and mass tort class actions do not represent the
majority of class actions filed in or removed to federal court. In
Class Action Dilemmas, the Rand Institute for Civil Justice reported
that, for the period 1995–1996, securities class actions accounted for
19% of class actions in reported cases and 17% of class actions
reported in the general press.4 Tort class actions, a category larger
than mass torts, accounted for 9% and 14% respectively.5 Added
together, securities and tort class actions accounted for between 28%
and 31% of class actions identified using these measures. A 2008
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) report found that in the first half of
2007, securities class actions accounted for 3.6% of all class action
filings and removals in federal court, while tort class actions
accounted for just 2.7%.6
* Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center, Retired (effective July 1, 2010). Adjunct
Professor, Hastings College of The Law.
** Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center. Institutional affiliation is provided for
identification purposes only. The views expressed in this Article represent the views of the authors and
do not represent the views or positions of the Federal Judicial Center or any other entity in the judicial
branch. The authors gratefully acknowledge the work and comments of several colleagues: George
Cort, Laural Hooper, Marie Leary, Angelia Levy, Dean Miletich, Robert Niemic, and Shelia Thorpe.
1. JAY TIDMARSH, MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE CASE STUDIES 1 (1998).
2. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Security Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1539–1540 (2006) (stating that security class actions
are ―the 800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other forms of class actions‖).
3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1344 (1995). The literature on mass tort class actions includes a great deal of work
either conducted by or published by the Federal Judicial Center. See, e.g., TIDMARSH, supra note 1; S.
ELIZABETH GIBSON, CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS &
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS (Federal Judicial Center 2000); THOMAS WILLGING, ET AL,
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MASS TORTS CASE CONGREGATIONS: A REPORT TO THE MASS
TORTS WORKING GROUP app. D (Federal Judicial Center 1999).
4. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 53 fig. 3-1 (2000). Not
surprisingly, securities class actions were much more common in the business press, accounting for 39
percent of all class actions in business reporting. Id.
5. Id.
6. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS
ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
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There are certainly other ways to gauge the importance of
categories of class actions other than by news items or filings. One
might look to the number of settlements that result from the filings—
in that respect, securities class actions seem particularly important.
Securities class actions clearly represent the plurality of class
settlements in federal court in recent years, about 37% of class
settlements in 2006–2007.7 Or one might look to the number of
claimants affected by the class certification decision. Mass tort cases
especially, whether certified as classes or not, may represent the
aggregation of tens of thousands of claimants in a single proceeding,
often in a multidistrict litigation.8
But there is much class action activity in the federal courts beyond
the securities and mass tort class actions. It is to that oftenoverlooked class action activity to which we turn.
The findings presented in this Article are the result of research
originally requested by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules (Rules Committee) in 2005. Prior to passage of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)—effective February 18,
2005—there was concern that CAFA might overwhelm the federal
courts with class actions removed from the state courts.9 A large part
of the CAFA research performed for the Rules Committee focused on
the impact of CAFA on filings in and removals to federal courts,
post-CAFA.10 That research was concluded with the April 2008
publication of a report on filings and removals in the federal courts
from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2007.11
The original design of the study also envisioned a second phase of
research beyond merely counting class actions filed in or removed to
federal court; to ―measure CAFA‘s impact on litigation activity and
judicial rulings in class actions in the federal courts.‖12 Because of
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3–5 (2008) [hereinafter FOURTH REPORT]. Note, however, that
these estimates include Fair Labor Standard Act opt-in class actions in the denominator and count MDL
and other consolidations as a single case.
7. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards,
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 818 tab. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Empirical Study].
8. See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010) [hereinafter
Consolidations].
9. For a discussion of predictions of CAFA‘s impact and the evolving judicial branch positions
with regard to CAFA, see Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1723, 1725–33, 1740–42 (2008) [hereinafter Impact of CAFA].
10. See id. at 1747–49 (discussing how to determine CAFA‘s impact).
11. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 6.
12. Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the
Federal Courts: Preliminary Findings From Phase Two’s Pre-CAFA Sample of Diversity Class Actions,
256 F.R.D. 218 (2009) [hereinafter Preliminary Findings].
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CAFA‘s potential impact on the workload of the federal courts, it
made sense for the first phase to focus on class actions based on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
CAFA both permitted
aggregation of individual claims to meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement—for aggregate claims in excess of $5,000,000—and
lowered the diversity requirement from complete diversity between
named parties to minimal diversity.13
In collecting the class action data, however, the study was not
limited to acquiring information on diversity class actions. CAFA
might, the Rules Committee surmised, change the types of claims
litigants assert in federal question cases. As a result, a large amount
of data was gathered on a sample of federal question class actions
filed in or removed to the federal courts in the two years before and
the two years after CAFA‘s effective date. In what follows, however,
we will ignore the question of CAFA‘s impact on federal-question
class actions and treat the sample as a four-year filing cohort. Our
purpose is to provide some descriptive information on the rate of
class certification and the rate of class settlement in the sampled
cases and, where appropriate, to generalize from the sample to the
population of federal-question class actions.
Civil rights, employment discrimination, contracts and consumer
fraud, antitrust, civil RICO, and ERISA claims comprise the bulk of
the sampled cases. The sampled cases include very few tort cases,
without a single products liability multidistrict litigation included
among the sampled federal question cases; in the study period, all
such cases were based on diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, the second
phase of the study excluded securities class actions. The reason for
this was simple: we needed to devise some means of reducing the
burden of the data collection—especially given that the focus of the
overall project was diversity class actions—and it made sense to
exclude securities class actions, the category which has been written
about the most.14 In this symposium issue alone, for example, there
is an empirical article on securities class actions.15 Given resource
constraints, we determined to study other federal question class
action settlements.
Part I sets out some of the empirical findings of our research into
federal question class actions, beginning with class actions removed
from the state courts, then moving on to class actions initially filed in
federal court. After a brief digression into Fair Labor Standards Act
13. See Impact of CAFA, supra note 9, at 1733–35.
14. See Coffee, Reforming the Security Class Action, supra note 3; Janet Cooper Alexander, Do
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
15. Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349 (2011)
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(FLSA) collective actions, Part I concludes with some information
about case processing times. Part II then puts the findings presented
in Part I in historical and scholarly context. The first subpart of Part
II discusses the changing law of the class action. The second subpart
compares the present findings to the handful of comparable studies.
I. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In what follows, the term ―class action‖ means any case filed in or
removed to federal court in which the plaintiff(s) made class
allegations at any point in the litigation; it is not limited to cases in
which a class was certified.16 Indeed, as we will see shortly, motions
for class certification are never filed in many cases filed as proposed
class actions. We prefer to treat removals and original proceedings
separately because removal cases have a possible outcome—remand
to state court—that is not available for original proceedings, thus
making direct comparison difficult. Part I.A addresses federal
question removals and Part I.B addresses federal question original
proceedings.
A. Removals

Figure 1 presents a flowchart illustrating the class certification and
settlement activity in the 297 sampled federal question class actions
removed to federal court during the study period. About half of the
federal question removal cases are classified in the civil rights or
employment discrimination category. The next largest category is
labor, often state-law labor claims, but including some ERISA
claims.
The first decision point with removal cases is whether the case will
stay in federal court or whether it will be remanded to state court. As
Figure 1 shows, the remand rate for the removed class actions was
32.3%—96 of the 297 removed class actions were remanded to state
court. Interestingly, the remand rate was very high considering the
removed cases in which a motion to remand was actually filed. Fully
71.3% of removed cases in which a remand motion was filed were in
fact remanded to state court. For example, in Kronemeyer v. U.S.
National Bank,17 the defendant bank removed the case from the
Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, arguing that plaintiff‘s
claims—specifically that the bank committed ―wrongful dishonor‖
16. Cf. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
17. Kronemeyer v. U.S. Nat‘l Bank Assn., No. 3:4cv250 (S.D. Ill., removed April 12, 2004;
remanded August 3, 2004).
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under Illinois state law18 when it charged customers without an
account with the bank a fee for cashing checks—was preempted by
the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 (NBA). Plaintiffs moved to
remand and the court granted the motion, holding that plaintiffs‘
claims were not completely preempted because no remedy for such a
claim exists under the NBA, distinguishing Beneficial National Bank
v. Anderson.19
Similarly, in Donegan v. WMC Mortgage Corp.,20 defendant
residential mortgage lender and servicer removed a class action that
alleged it had collected a prepayment penalty from plaintiffs and the
class in violation of Alabama law. Defendants argued that the loan
was made under federal legal standards. They contended that the
federal Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act21 completely
preempted Alabama law on the subject. Defendant also argued that
complete diversity existed among the parties and the disgorgement
remedy plaintiff sought should be valued at more than $75,000.
More than ten months after removal, the district, rejected both
arguments and held that any preemption was not complete. The court
further held that the amount in controversy was not satisfied and
remanded the case.
But in some cases, remand was more consensual and less litigated.
For example, in O’Neill v. Trident Land Transfer Co. of New Jersey,
L.P.,22 defendants removed an action alleging violations of the Real
Estate Settlement Practices Act (RESPA),23 and New Jersey‘s
Consumer Protection Act. The claims stemmed from the practice of
defendant real estate agents charging a $25 courier fee included on
the HUD-1 closing report. After more than eight months, with little
federal docket activity, the parties filed, and the district judge signed,
a stipulation and consent order remanding the case to New Jersey
Superior Court. The stipulation recited the prospect of settlement
under the state statute and referred to the availability of settlement
provisions in New Jersey.
Of the approximately two-thirds of removed class actions not
remanded to state court, a motion to certify a litigation class—or, as
the figure denotes, a ―contested‖ motion for class certification—was
filed in 30.8% cases, 62 out of 201 times. To put it the other way, in
18. 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-402 (2010).
19. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
20. Donegan v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 3:3cv1053-T (M.D. Ala., Oct. 22, 2003) (order).
21. Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (2006).
22. O‘Neill v. Trident Land Transfer Co., No. 06-CV-2727 (D.N.J. June 16, 2006) (stipulation
and consent order at 2).
23. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2006).
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almost 70% (139 out of 201 cases) no contested motion to certify a
class was ever filed. Of these cases, a small number resulted in class
settlement, discussed below. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed most
of the remaining cases before filing a motion for class certification.
Voluntary dismissal may signal that an individual settlement of the
claims was reached by the parties, although this is often not apparent
from the docket records alone.24
In the 62 cases in which a contested motion for class certification
was filed, at least one contested motion was granted in sixteen cases,
or 25.8% of cases. This does not necessarily mean that one or more
motions for class certification were denied in the remaining 74.2% of
cases in which a motion was filed. In a number of cases, the
contested motion was rendered moot when the parties reached a
settlement agreement and filed a motion to certify a settlement class.
―No court action‖ was a relatively common outcome for contested
motions. Also worth noting is that the mean time from the filing of
the motion to a court ruling was 4.3 months in the removal cases.
Thus, even after a motion was filed, there was time for the parties to
continue to discuss settlement.
As shown in Figure 1, in the sixteen cases in which one or more
contested motion for class certification was granted, twelve, or 75%
of the time, they resulted in a class settlement. The remaining four
cases did not. When a litigation class has been certified but does not
result in a class settlement, the outcomes tend to be either a summary
or trial judgment for the defendants. However, in one of these four
cases the class certification ruling was overturned after the
defendants appealed using a Rule 23(f) motion.
Of the 46 cases in which one or more contested motions for class
certification was filed but not granted, seven, or 15.2%, resulted in a
class settlement without a favorable ruling on a motion for class
certification. The remaining 39 cases, or 84.8%, did not. In other
words, we did not find many class settlements among the removed
cases in cases in which the court considered but did not grant motions
to certify a litigation class.
It is interesting that sixteen cases resulted in a class settlement
without the plaintiffs filing a contested motion for class certification.
In other words, more than half of the settlements had no motion to

24. For a discussion of voluntary dismissal cases, see Preliminary Findings, supra note 12, at
223. In that Article, addressing a sample of class actions based on diversity jurisdiction, we wrote: ―The
voluntary dismissal cases present something of a mystery. They make up the largest group of cases in
the pre-CAFA sample and represent a majority of non-remanded class action cases . . . . [N]either
plaintiffs nor defendants seem to have pursued them very aggressively . . . .‖ Id. Of course, voluntary
dismissals make up a relatively large portion of all federal cases.
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certify a class. Those sixteen cases represent 11.5% of the 139 cases
in which a contested motion was never filed. In these cases, the
parties apparently went straight to an agreement to settle the class
claims. In Schwartz v. GE Capital Consumer Card Co.,25 for
example, the representative plaintiff, holder of a credit card account,
sued the issuing bank for sending a periodic billing statement that
disclosed the daily percentage rate but failed to disclose a
corresponding annual percentage rate, contrary to the Truth in
Lending Act.26 No motions to certify or address the merits were
docketed. After a settlement conference with the magistrate judge
(hearing the case by consent), the parties moved for preliminary and
final approval of a class settlement. The court preliminarily certified
a settlement class, and later finally approved the terms of the
settlement. The representative plaintiff received a $2,500 incentive
award; a $295,000 settlement fund was set aside for the class; and
class counsel received a fee of $70,000. In the end, awards of $70.94
were sent to the 4,158 class members who submitted valid claims.
Cases like Schwartz should be considered with the cases in which
a motion was filed but the court never ruled in favor of a contested
motion. Together, 23 out of 35 total class settlements in the removed
cases, 65.7%, were cases without a favorable ruling for class
settlement. Overall, in the removed cases, class settlement was the
outcome in 35 out of 297 cases, or 11.8%. (These cases constitute a
larger percentage of the non-remanded cases, of course, which total
17.4%.) Calculating the 95% confidence interval for this proportion
yields a margin of error of 3.7%, so we estimate that the actual
proportion of class settlements among removed federal question class
actions in the study period is between 8.1% and 15.5%. In the entire
population in the four-year study period, then, we would expect to
find between 75 and 144 class settlements in removed class actions
based on federal question jurisdiction, with a point estimate of 109.
B. Original Proceedings

Figure 2 presents a flowchart illustrating the class certification and
settlement activity in the 457 federal question class actions sampled
as original proceedings in federal court during the study period. Civil
rights actions, including employment discrimination, were the most
common nature of suit category. A motion to certify a litigation
class—that is, a contested motion for class certification—was filed in
25. Schwartz v. GE Capital Consumer Card Co., No. CV-06-0394 (JMA) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,
2006) (declaration of L. Stephens Tilghman regarding mailing of distribution checks).
26. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
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just over one-third, or 35.2%, of these cases. In almost two-thirds of
the federal question original proceedings, no motion for class
certification was ever filed. The most common outcome in these
cases was voluntary dismissal, which may indicate an individual
settlement, as discussed above.27
At least one contested motion was granted in 36.6% of the cases in
which such motions were filed, 59 out of 161. No contested motion
to certify was granted in 63.4% of the cases in which such a motion
was filed. As discussed above, this does not mean that all contested
motions to certify filed in a given case were denied. Indeed, in
nineteen of these cases, or 18.6%, the court approved a motion for
preliminary approval of a settlement class after the filing of a
contested motion but without ever acting on a contested motion. It is
worth noting that the median time to decision for contested motions
for class certification among the original proceedings was 3.9
months, which means that the parties had time to negotiate
settlements during the pendency of the motions.
In the 296 proposed class actions in which no contested motion for
class certification was ever filed, class settlements resulted in 22
cases, or 7.4% of the time. For example, in Butler v. Santa Cruz
County,28 plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of pretrial detainees who
had been incarcerated in the county jail and who were strip searched
either before arraignment or after a court had ordered their release
from detention. There was no motion for class certification, nor was
there any motion directed at the merits of the complaint. More than
one year after a referral to mediation, the parties jointly moved for
preliminary approval of a class settlement. The court granted its
approval, implicitly certified a class, and authorized that notice be
sent to the proposed class. The gross amount of the settlement was
$3,875,000, with $2,600,000 to be paid to the class; $75,000 to the
class representative; $950,000 to be paid to the attorneys for fees and
costs; and $250,000 allocated to an administration fund. Class
members were entitled to receive between $750 and $3,000,
depending on the number of searches and the type of alleged crime.
Notices were sent to 3,487 class members and 856 claims had been
received as of the date of the final approval order.
Similarly, plaintiffs in Brower v. Financial Crimes Services LLC29
filed a class action for damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive
27. See Preliminary Findings, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
28. Butler v. Santa Cruz Cnty., No. 5:07-cv-941-JF (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (class action
complaint).
29. Brower v. Fin. Crimes Serv., LLC, No. 06-CV-4237 FLN (D. Minn. Oct. 19. 2006) (order
granting final approval of class settlement and dismissal of the defendants).
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relief on behalf of a class of consumers who either (1) received a
letter from defendant in an envelope with the name ―Worthless
Check Diversion Program‖ in the upper left corner or (2) received a
letter from the defendant falsely stating that it is a ―licensed debt
collector.‖ Defendant initially moved to dismiss and for summary
judgment but withdrew the motions and agreed to a settlement. The
court preliminarily certified the proposed Rule 23(b)(3) classes for
settlement only, about six months after the case was filed, and then
finally approved a settlement with these terms: distribution of $20
each to 390 class members for a total of $7,800, payment of $1,000
to the named plaintiff, and an award of $11,000 in attorney fees.
Cases like Butler and Brower are among the nineteen cases in
which a class settlement occurred without a favorable ruling on class
certification. Of all class settlements in the federal question original
proceedings, slightly more than half, 53.9%, occurred in cases
without a favorable ruling on class certification. Still, class
settlement is a likely outcome after certification of a litigation class.
Consider Bruce v. Wells Fargo Bank NA.30 Plaintiff, an individual
who received a solicitation from the defendant bank, alleged that the
bank accessed his credit history without his consent and without
presenting a ―firm offer of credit,‖ in violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA).31 The court granted defendant‘s motion for
dismissal of one count, but the FCRA claim was not included in the
motion. Plaintiff moved for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class,
which the court granted. The class was defined as all recipients of a
solicitation like that received by plaintiff who did not receive credit
from the defendant. The plaintiff, with the court‘s agreement, limited
the class to an estimated 40,000–60,000 residents of Lake and Porter
counties in Indiana. Six months later the parties moved for approval
of a class settlement. The proposal, which the court initially
approved, provided for payment of $1,000 to the named plaintiff,
$200 to each class member who submitted a valid claim form, and
$75,000 in fees to class counsel. A motion for final approval
indicated that notice had been sent to 4,377 class members (200 of
which were undeliverable), generating 1,525 claims and a total
payout of $305,000. No explanation was found for the shrinkage of
the class from 40,000 to 4,377. The court approved the class
settlement as described.
As seen in Figure 2, class settlement was the outcome in 16.6% of
the federal question original proceedings. Calculating the 95%
30. Bruce v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:5cv243 (N.D. Ind. June 20, 2005) (final approval
order).
31. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
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confidence interval for this proportion yields a margin of error of
3.4%, so we estimate that the actual proportion of class settlements
among federal question class actions initially filed in federal court in
the study period is between 13.2% and 20%. In the entire population
in the four-year study period, then, we would expect to find between
693 and 1,050 class settlements in removed class actions based on
federal question jurisdiction, with a point estimate of 870.
Together with the findings on removal class actions, this suggests
an estimate of class settlements, in non-securities federal question
cases, of around 1,000 for the four-year study period, or around 250
per year.
This estimate appears comparable with Professor
Fitzpatrick‘s findings in his recent study of class settlement.
Fitzpatrick found 304 class settlements in 2006 and 384 in 2007;32
however, his study included all class settlements, including securities
settlements, which represented the most common category,33 and
diversity class settlements, which likely represent a small number in
any given year.34 Our estimates are certainly not inconsistent with
somewhere around 400 class settlements in the federal courts in any
given year in the last decade.
Perhaps the most striking finding in Figure 2 is that, in cases in
which one or more contested motion for class settlement was granted,
a class settlement resulted in just 57.6% of cases. Given the
conventional wisdom that the denial of a motion to certify signals the
death knell for a proposed plaintiff class and the grant of a motion to
certify a litigation class forces the defendant to settle,35 we expected
this figure to be much higher. As discussed in the removals section,
however, there are several possible outcomes for cases in which a
litigation class is certified. The defendants may prevail, for example,
at summary judgment or at trial. The litigation class may be
overruled on a Rule 23(f) appeal.36
Another possible outcome is decertification of a certified litigation

32. See Empirical Study, supra note 7, at 818 tab. 1.
33. See id. (showing securities class settlements accounting for 40% of class settlements in 2006
and 35% in 2007).
34. See id. at 818–19 (―[T]here were almost no mass tort class actions . . . settled over the twoyear period.‖). Of course, diversity class settlements need not be ―mass tort‖ settlements.
35. See, for example, Judge Easterbrook‘s opinion in Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181
F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (―[A] grant of class status can put considerable pressure on the defendant
to settle, even when the plaintiff‘s probability of success on the merits is slight. Many corporate
executives are unwilling to bet their company that they are in the right in big-stakes litigation, and a
grant of class status can propel the stakes of a case into the stratosphere.‖). Of course, the sampled cases
may not have been, in any sense, ―bet the company‖ type cases.
36. Interestingly, Blair, 181 F.3d 832 was the Seventh Circuit‘s first case involving Rule 23(f).
For a summary of empirical studies of Rule 23(f), see Consolidations, supra note 8, at 783.
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class. For example, in Thompson v. Linvatec Corp.,37 an ERISA
action, the court initially certified a litigation class on May 22, 2007.
The plaintiff class alleged that the employer had violated sales
representatives‘ contractual right to severance benefits after
acquisition by another company. The defendants moved for
reconsideration, claiming that the district court had not followed
Second Circuit‘s precedent, specifically In re Initial Public Offering
Securities Litigation.38 The district court disagreed, but in a
subsequent order, issued June 22, 2010, it found that the plaintiff
class no longer met the numerosity requirement for class
certification. Specifically, the court found that too few sales
representatives remained in the class. In addition to decertifying the
class, the court granted the defendant‘s motion for summary
judgment, terminating the case.
Even reaching a class settlement may not signal the ―conclusion‖
of a case. Take the fascinating case of Murray v. Indymac Bank
FSB.39 The named plaintiff in Murray had received a solicitation for
refinancing from the defendant bank. Plaintiff alleged that the bank
accessed the credit histories of class members without consent and
without presenting a ―firm offer of credit,‖ in violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).40 After the court denied defendant‘s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the parties proposed a class
settlement, which the court preliminarily approved. The nationwide
class was comprised of all persons to whom defendant or an affiliate
mailed a prescreened offer of credit on or after November 24, 2002.
The gross amount of the settlement was $1,600,000, with
approximately $1,267,731 to be distributed to class members who
submitted valid claims, $330,000 awarded to class counsel, and
$3,000 to the named plaintiff. The motion for final approval
indicated that notices had been mailed to 1,249,605 class members,
of whom 11,421 submitted valid claims—to be paid $110 each.
This was not the end of Murray, however. Within a week after the
court entered final judgment, several individually represented class
members filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b) on
the grounds that they had not received notice of the proposed
settlement. They alleged that class counsel and defendant agreed to
limit the class notice to class members who had been mailed a
37. Memorandum—Decision and Order, Thompson v. Linvatec Corp., No. 6:06-cv-404 (NPM /
GJD) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006).
38. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d. Cir. 2006).
39. Murray v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B., No. 04 C 7669 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2004) (memorandum
opinion).
40. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
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prescreened offer of credit between June 3 and June 27, 2005, a small
portion of the class as originally defined, which perhaps explains
why less than ten percent of the defined class filed claims. The court
granted the motion and vacated its judgment approving the class
settlement. Plaintiff, with leave of the court, filed an amended
complaint that excluded the individually represented plaintiffs
(apparently by limiting the proposed class to Illinois residents). They
also limited the class to those that alleged willful violations of the
FCRA. The court granted plaintiffs‘ motion to certify a class of
Illinois residents who received a letter of solicitation from defendant.
Plaintiffs estimated the size of the class to be 18,000 members. Cross
motions for summary judgment followed, focusing on the element of
willfulness. After initially granting plaintiff‘s motion, the court
vacated its judgment to await the Supreme Court‘s decision in Safeco
Ins. Co. of America v. Burr.41 Based on that decision, the court
granted defendant‘s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff
appealed, but the appeal was later dismissed with no indication of a
settlement, class or otherwise. Thus the once-certified class of over a
million members, and its lawyers, took home nothing.
C. Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Actions

A number of cases in the study consisted of a collective action for
damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and no other claim for relief. These actions
differ from class actions under Rule 23 in several important ways,
particularly regarding class certification.
Because of these
differences between class actions and FLSA collective actions, each
type of case deserves separate analysis.
Section 216(b) explicitly authorizes such actions ―by any one or
more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated.‖ The statutory authorization means
that the parties do not have to satisfy the criteria of Rule 23 (a) and
(b). Identifying other employees who are similarly situated is enough.
These collective actions proceed by court-approved notice to the
other employees, generally at an early stage of the proceedings. Only
employees who file a written consent to become a party are included.
In other words, these cases proceed as opt-in as opposed to opt-out
cases. They are generally termed collective actions, not class actions.
There are a great many FLSA collective actions in the federal
courts. The sample included 487 FLSA collective actions initially
41. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2207 (2007).
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filed in federal court. Out of that number, only 45, or 9.2%, resulted
in a collective settlement of the claims raised in the complaint. It is
difficult to tell from the docket records whether the individual cases
settled, but it appears that many FLSA collective actions terminate
very quickly after filing. This may indicate that a relatively high
percentage of such cases result in an individual settlement of the
plaintiff‘s wage-and-hour claims. In FLSA actions that did not result
in a collective settlement, the median time from filing to termination
was 7.3 months. By way of comparison, the median time from filing
to termination in civil rights actions that did not result in a class
settlement was 15.2 months. The next Part provides a brief
discussion of time to termination.
Before turning to that topic, however, it may be useful to provide
an example of an FLSA collective action that resulted in a collective
settlement. Crawford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County42 was
heavily litigated over a period of more than two years and settled on
the eve of trial. The lawsuit was brought by corrections officers
against the county government for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) and wage-and-hour provisions of state law.
The FLSA claims were brought as an opt-in collective action, but the
state law claims were brought as an opt-out class action under Rule
23. (It is important to remember that FLSA opt-in and Rule 23 optout class actions are not mutually exclusive.) The court granted
defendants‘ motion to dismiss the state law claims on the grounds of
sovereign immunity, thereby mooting plaintiffs‘ motion to have the
class and collective actions proceed simultaneously. The court
granted plaintiffs‘ motion to conditionally certify the claims as a
collective action and later granted plaintiffs‘ motions to create three
subclasses: one dealing with all claims relating to meal breaks and
the other two dealing with all claims brought by captains and
lieutenants (who are arguably exempt from the FLSA). In total, 340
workers opted into the proceedings. Later, the court reviewed the
conditional certification by ruling on defendants‘ motion to decertify
the subclasses. This is a traditional two-tiered approach to FLSA
collective actions: conditionally certifying a class is primarily for
notice and does not require much more than claims that the parties
worked for the same employer during the same period. The second
tier, triggered by a motion to decertify, more closely examines the
extent to which the claimants are similarly situated.43 After careful
examination of the meal break claims, the court denied the motion to
42. Crawford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov‘t, No. 06-299-JBC (E.D. Ky. Sept. 13,
2006) (memorandum opinion and order).
43. See, e.g., Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006).
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decertify that subclass. The court granted defendants‘ unopposed
motion to decertify the captains and lieutenants subclasses. After
further pretrial skirmishing, the parties announced a settlement which
the court initially approved and then finally accepted. The settlement
provided for the creation of a settlement fund for allocation of
payment for uncompensated work during meal breaks to be divided
among the 340 claimants who opted into the case. The court
approved up to $870,000 in attorney fees as well as injunctive relief
in the form of changes to meal periods and other employment
practices.
D. Disposition Times

Table 1 displays the median disposition times for several
categories of cases included in the study. The following figures
exclude FLSA collective actions.
Original filings that did not result in a class settlement terminated
in the district court in a median of 281.5 days, or about 9.3 months.
Class settlements in the original proceedings took a median time of
636 days, or about 20.9 months, to terminate in the district court.
For federal question removals, the median time to termination is
different for cases remanded to state court, cases not remanded but
not settled as class actions, and class settlements. The median time to
termination in federal court for a case remanded to state court is 111
days, or about 3.7 months. The median time to termination for a case
not remanded, but not resulting in a class settlement, is 300.5 days, or
about 9.9 months. The median time to termination of a class
settlement case was 746.5 days, or 24.6 months—just over two years.
II. DISCUSSION

One hears much about the vanishing trial. Some also seem to
expect the class action to disappear, or at least diminish in frequency.
Recent federal statutes, Rule 23 changes, case law, and guides for
judges all point toward raising the standards for class action
certification and settlement. A partial list of examples of this
phenomenon includes:



Supreme Court rejection of class action settlements in Amchem44
and Ortiz;45
Congressional expansion of federal jurisdiction over diversity

44. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
45. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss2/3

14

Willging and Lee: CLASS CERTIFICATION AND CLASS SETTLEMENT: FINDINGS FROM FEDERAL

2011]

CLASS CERTIFICATION AND CLASS SETTLEMENT











329

cases in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005;46
Changes in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 that opened up
the opportunity for appellate review of class certification
decisions, loosened the timing of class certification, and
tightened the federal requirements for certifying classes;47
Federal Judicial Center publications such as the Manual for
Complex Litigation, Fourth48 and the pocket guide for judges on
managing class action litigation49 that translated the above
changes into operational case management guidance;
Case law applying the Rule 23 changes that challenge class
action plaintiffs to present clear and detailed trial plans and
demand reliable expert evidence supporting claims for recovery
on common elements of plaintiffs‘ claims for relief;50
Case law adding ascertainability of the class as a precondition to
class certification;51
Contractual clauses designed to thwart class litigation and shunt
potential class actions into arbitration forums where individual
claims are to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, without any
opportunity to aggregate claims;52 and
Supreme Court rejection of class certification and articulation of
standards for finding common question of law or fact in Dukes v.
Wal-Mart.53

Such developments may have had the effect of shifting some
aggregate litigation, such as products liability claims, to non-class
settings, especially multidistrict litigation, and to non-class
settlements.54
Of course, heightened standards for class certification may not
affect filings and removals in the federal courts in a single direction.
Heightened standards may deter plaintiffs‘ attorneys from filing in
federal court and may encourage efforts to avoid removal to federal
court. But defendants may seek to remove more cases from states in
which the federal trend toward heightened standards has not
prevailed. The expansion of federal jurisdiction as a result of CAFA
has increased federal filings and removals, shifting diversity cases
46. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 68–76.
48. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).
49. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:
A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (3d ed. 2010).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 77–97.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 98–101.
52. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
53. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
54. See generally Symposium, Aggregate Justice: Perspectives 10 Years After Amchem and
Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889 (2010).
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from state to federal court. The overall impact of CAFA on the total,
nationwide volume of class action filings is unknown, but there are
some indications that class action filings in state courts have
increased.55 One might even speculate that a decreasing success rate,
in terms of achieving class certification, may lead to the counterintuitive result of more filings. After all, plaintiffs‘ attorneys need to
win attorney fees in at least some number of cases to remain in
business. If the chances of prevailing in any given action decrease,
they may have to file more cases.
Whatever the national trends in filings and removals, it is clear that
statistics on filings and removals are simply not the best available
indicator of the condition of the class action today. As Part I
explained, motions for class certification are not even filed in most
proposed class actions filed in or removed to federal court. Filings
data only go so far. In the remainder of this Article, we turn to
previous studies of class certification and settlement to set the
findings presented in Part I in context. But the key to remember is
that there are few studies of class action certification and settlement
in general. From 1966–2011, there were five studies, counting the
present one, that shed light on the question, too few to conclude that
class certification is in fact diminishing or disappearing. One is left
with the distinct impression, however, that there has been a shift in
practice. To that shift, we now turn.
A. The Changing Law of Class Actions

Prior to 1966, Rule 23 defined categories of class actions in terms

55. See, e.g., Gail E. Lees, et al, 2009: First Quarter Updates on Class Action Trends, 10 CLASS
399 (BNA) (April 24, 2009), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents
(―Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher class action lawyers report that state court class action activity in many
courts has not diminished. CAFA has prompted a flurry of single state class actions filed in state
courts‖; ―In Los Angeles alone, for example, class action filings have increased 55 percent in the last 3
years—from 516 filings in 2005 to 801 filings in 2008.‖); see also SEYFARTH SHAW CLASS ACTION
REPORT—2008
EDITION,
available
at
http://www.seyfarth.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.publications_detail/object_id/375370ea8813-4bb1-b964-5452548ad24a/SeyfarthShawClassActionReport2008Edition.cfm (concluding ―While
shareholder and securities class action filings experienced a slight uptick in 2007, employment-related
class action filings increased significantly. Anecdotally, surveys of corporate counsel confirmed that
workplace litigation – and especially class action and multi-plaintiff lawsuits – continues as the chief
exposure driving corporate legal budget expenditures.‖). But cf. Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of
the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 KAN.
L. REV. 809, 815 (2010) (finding ― a significant reduction in class action filings in the Oklahoma state
courts post-CAFA [and] a similar reduction in [federal court] class actions filings during this same
period‖); and Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1609 (2008) (reporting class action filings in Madison County, Illinois—―a forum at which [CAFA] was
unabashedly directed‖—―dropped sharply when CAFA took effect‖).
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of the abstract nature of the rights involved.56 In 1966, the
Committee on Rules adopted fundamental changes to
Rule 23, but the 1966 amendments clearly contemplated that what
we now call ―mass torts‖—even the single incident variety— were
not expected to fall within the new rule.57 The structure of the 1966
rule favored early class certification, even provisional certification,
which effectively gives the benefit of any doubt to the class
representatives. Rule 23(c)(1) directed that a court determine class
status ―as soon as practicable‖ after the complaint is filed.
Committee notes in 1966 specified that an ―order embodying a
[class] determination may be conditional‖ and can be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits if, upon fuller
development of the facts, the original determination appears
unsound.58 For a Rule 23(b)(3) class to be certified, the court had to
determine that the requirements of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, common
questions of law or fact, typicality, and adequacy of representation)
are met; that questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate; and that a class action is superior to other available
alternatives for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter to the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, anticipated controversy and urged a moratorium on
revisiting the amendments until their workings could be fully
assessed. Professor Kaplan stated, ―It will take a generation or so
before we can fully appreciate the scope, the virtues, and the vices of
new Rule 23.‖59 As a measure of the esteem in which Professor
Kaplan was held, the rule makers refrained from considering changes
in Rule 23 for almost a generation.
Since the 1990s, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
amended to make class certification more difficult; the likely effect
of such amendments should be seen in a diminishing percentage of
cases filed as class actions that result in class certification, whether
for litigation or settlement. In May 1993 the Advisory Committee,
following a recommendation by the Judicial Conference‘s Ad Hoc
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Committee Note, 1966 Amendment, at ―Difficulties with the original
rule‖ (West 2010) (describing ―the so-called ‗true‘ category . . . defined as involving ‗joint, common, or
secondary rights; the ‗hybrid‘ category, as involving ‗several‘ rights related to specific property; [and]
the ‗spurious‘ category, as involving ‗several‘ rights affected by a common question and related to
common relief.‖).
57. Id. at subdiv. (b)(3) (stating that ―A ‗mass accident‘ resulting in injuries to numerous persons
is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not
only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate
in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.‖).
58. Id. at subdiv. (c)(1).
59. Kaplan is quoted saying this in, among other places. HENSLER, supra note 4, at 35.
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Committee on Asbestos Litigation,60 considered a draft revision of
Rule 23 for the first time since the 1960s.61 The original proposal
included numerous changes in Rules 23(a) and (b) and would have
altered certification requirements to a considerable degree.62 For
example, the proposal would have expanded the criteria in Rule 23(a)
to include a requirement for all class actions that the Rule 23
procedure be found superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Rule 23(b) then listed a
series of factors, mostly those specified in the (1), (2), and (3)
subsections of current Rule 23(b), to be considered in determining
superiority. Distinctions among (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) classes
would have been eliminated.63
That proposal did not advance in its original form and was
replaced by a proposal that would have retained the (b)(1), (b)(2),
and (b)(3) classes and added subsections that would have expanded
certification options to include settlement classes (including ―claims
that could not be litigated on a class basis‖), opt-in classes (using
―permissive joinder‖ as the rubric), and hybrid classes that would
join claims for injunctive relief with claims for individual damages
under opt-in, opt-out, or settlement class certification.64 Factors to be
considered in determining predominance and superiority of a (b)(3)
class action would have included ―the practical ability of individual
class members to pursue their claims without class certification,‖ ―the
probable success on the merits of the class claims,‖ and whether the
public and private benefits of class litigation would justify the
burdens of the litigation—the ―just ain‘t worth it‖ clause.65
After publication in August 1996,66 and following several wellattended, contentious public hearings and extensive committee
debate, the Advisory Committee abandoned efforts to define rulebased factors that would guide district judges in deciding whether to
certify a class. Committee consensus—the underpinning for most
rulemaking activity in the judicial branch—was limited to approval
of Rule 23(f), creating a permissive interlocutory appeal of a decision
60. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION
(1991).
61. MINUTES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (May 3d–5th, 1993).
62. THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES app. A (1996) [hereinafter FJC 1996 Study] (containing a copy of the 1993 proposal).
63. Id. at 96.
64. FJC 1996 Study, supra note 62, at app. B (containing November 1995 draft).
65. Id. at 101 (concerning Proposed Rule 23(b)(3) (A), (E), and (F), respectively).
66. The supporting materials can be found in Proposed Rules, 167 F.R.D. 535 (1996); the
proposed amendments to Rule 23 at id. at 559.
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granting or denying class certification.67 The courts of appeals were
given sole discretion to decide whether to grant such an appeal.68
In another procedural change expected to affect class certification,
the committee changed the timing requirements for class certification
motions. As noted above, Rule 23(c)(1) required a court to
determine class status as soon as practicable after a class action
complaint was filed. The committee simply changed the quoted
language to ―at an early practicable time,‖ loosening the timing of a
district court‘s attention to class certification. The practical effect is
that a court could wait until the parties discovered enough
information to fully litigate the question of whether a class qualifies
for certification, including the question of whether plaintiffs could
use class-wide proof, to support class claims. There was no longer
the time pressure that might have compelled a court to certify a class
conditionally, pending further development of the factual basis for
such an order. As the Committee Notes makes abundantly clear, this
seemingly minor change opened the door for parties and judges to
explore the merits of an action before deciding whether to certify a
class, an approach that had been technically, if not practically,
restricted under some interpretations of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqelin.69 The committee said:
[D]iscovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information
required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented
at trial. In this sense, it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into
the ‗merits,‘ limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification
70
decision on an informed basis.

Although this change did not go into effect until 2003, the
committee unanimously recommended it in 199771 only to have it
rejected by the Standing Committee.72
Reinforcing the above change, the committee deleted from Rule
23(c)(1) the permission that a class certification ―may be
provisional.‖ Expressing the new approach, the committee stated
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
68. Id. at Committee Note, Subdivision (f), 1998 Amendments to Rule 23.
69. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (stating that there is nothing in either the
language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action and holding that
such a judicial inquiry into the merits may not be used to shift the costs of notifying the class to a
defendant.). We say ―practically‖ because it is hard to conceive that a judge would not pay any attention
to the merits of a case before certifying a class.
70. FED R. CIV. P. 23, Committee Note, Subdivision (c), ¶ 1, 2003 Amendments to Rule 23 West
Ed. 2010).
71. MINUTES, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES at ―Rule 23(c)(1)‖ (May 1–2, 1997).
72. MINUTES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18–19 (June 19–20, 1997).
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that ―[a] court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23
have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.‖73
These procedural changes opened the door to a more restrictive
approach to class certification. Empirical research documents, for
example, indicate that courts of appeals applied Rule 23(f) in a
manner that reversed class certification in more than half of the cases
but affirmed class certification in around 20% of the cases.74 In the
course of these rulings, courts of appeals necessarily articulated new
standards to govern class actions.
After 1995, notably absent from proposals to amend Rule 23 was
any serious effort to change directly the certification requirements
found in Rule 23(a) and (b).75 The Committee instead adopted the
two procedural mechanisms described above. The purpose of the
change in Rule 23(c)(1) was to guide district courts in making more
rigorous and unconditional decisions when faced with class
certification motions, and the purpose of the addition of Rule 23(f)
was to permit appellate courts to review class certification decision
and create new standards to guide district court actions. Both
changes likely had a substantial impact on class certification. A
recent appellate case illustrates how the changes have evolved.
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation,76 is perhaps the
―leading case‖77 of a number of recent decisions by courts of appeals
in a wide range of federal circuits78 that have called for ―rigorous
analysis‖ of motions to certify a class under Rule 23.79 Purchasers of
hydrogen peroxide and other chemicals filed a class action complaint
alleging conspiracy in restraint of trade against a number of chemical
manufacturers. After extensive discovery and after denying a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, the United States
73. FED R. CIV. P. 23, Committee Note, Subdivision (c), ¶ 1, 2003 Amendments to Rule 23 West
Ed. 2010).
74. See Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of Class Certification Decisions: A Preliminary
Empirical Study of Federal and State Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13 (2007); Barry Sullivan &
Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246
F.R.D. 277 (2008).
75. One proposed change would have collapsed subdivisions (b)(1), (2), and (3) into a single
provision that would ask ―whether a class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.‖ Id. The committee also considered whether to convert the opt-out form of Rule 23(b)(3)
to an opt-in form. Id. at 4–6.
76. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
77. Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits of
Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 351 (2011).
78. See, e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.
2008); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs.,
Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
79. The phrase ―rigorous analysis‖ in the class certification context originated in the Supreme
Court‘s decision in Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified a
class of direct purchasers spanning an eleven-year period.80
Defendants petitioned the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to allow an
interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f). The court granted the petition,
vacated the certification order, and remanded the case for further
consideration of whether to certify a class.
The Third Circuit‘s comprehensive review of the certification
order provided three primary points to guide district courts prior to
certifying a litigation class. First, the appellate court held that a
district court must make specific findings, ―not merely a ‗threshold
showing‘ by a party, that each requirement of Rule 23 is met . . . by a
preponderance of the evidence.‖81 Second, the district court ―must
resolve all factual and legal disputes relevant to class certification,
even if they overlap with the merits—including disputes touching on
elements of the cause of action.‖82 Finally, the court underscored the
above points and made clear that they apply to disputes regarding
―expert testimony, whether offered by a party seeking class
certification or by a party opposing it.‖83 Specifically, the court
concluded that a ruling that plaintiff‘s proposed expert testimony
satisfied the Daubert standard84 was not enough when defendants
disputed that testimony and proffered expert evidence in support of
their position. ―Weighing conflicting expert testimony at the
certification stage is not only permissible, it may be integral to the
rigorous analysis Rule 23 demands,‖85 the court held. This may
involve resolving credibility issues concerning the expert witnesses‘
diverging approaches.86 Though a court may find that resolving such
a conflict is unnecessary, it may not refrain from resolving the
80. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 308.
81. Id. at 307.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Note that because the district court had ruled on Daubert issues and the appropriateness of a
Daubert ruling was not the subject of the appeal, Hydrogen Peroxide does not directly resolve the
question of whether Daubert-type review of expert testimony for reliability must be conducted before
examining expert evidence at the certification stage (though the language of the opinion clearly point
toward mandating Daubert screening). In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 603 F. 3d 571, (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010), the Ninth Circuit ruled, 6–5, that a district court need not
invoke Daubert procedures to test the reliability of expert testimony at the class certification stage.
Wal-Mart was argued on March 29, 2011, and the Supreme Court may well weigh in on this issue
before the end of the current term. But note also that the word ―Daubert‖ was not used during oral
argument. Transcript of Oral Argument, Wal-Mart-Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No. 10-277 (Mar. 29, 2011).
For further discussion of the Daubert issues, see Catherine A. Bernard, Certification and Its
Discontents: Rule 23 and the Role of Daubert, CIRCUIT RIDER (Seventh Circuit Members Only, May
2011) (on file with the authors).
85. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 323.
86. Id. at 324.
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conflict simply ―because of concern for an overlap with the merits.‖87
In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court put to rest any cause for
concern about examining the merits in a class certification decision.88
The majority expressed doubt that Daubert does not apply to class
certification rulings, but did not resolve the question.89
The Third Circuit found support for its approach in the 2003
amendments to Rule 23, specifically on the timing of certification
and the deletion of the authority for conditional class certification.90
Quoting from the Committee Note, the court focused the district
court‘s task on determining ―how the case will be tried.‖91
If Daubert represented a sea change in judicial responsibility for
screening expert testimony, the line of cases illustrated by Hydrogen
Peroxide represents a sea change on top of that change.92 Eisen no
longer restricts examination of the merits while deciding whether to
certify a class. In resolving disputes about expert testimony, district
courts may well end up resolving the central dispute in the litigation.
In effect, these rulings may preempt any need for ruling on summary
judgment. Insight into the scope of the change represented by cases
like Hydrogen Peroxide can be found by comparing the most recent
editions of the Manual for Complex Litigation. The Manual for
Complex Litigation, Third, was published by the Federal Judicial
Center in 1995 and largely written by its then director, United States
District Judge William W Schwarzer. The third edition repeats the
Eisen mantra that ―the court should not at this [class certification]
stage assess the merits of the underlying claim(s).‖93 It allowed that
―some discovery may be needed‖ to resolve class certification
questions.94 But nowhere in the thirteen pages devoted to class
certification does the third edition refer to the recent decision in
Daubert or any form of expert testimony.
The Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth,95published in 2004
87. Id.
88. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (stating that ―‘rigorous analysis‘‖ of class
certification will ―entail some overlap with the merits of plaintiff‘s underlying claim. That cannot be
helped.‖).
89. Id. at 2554.
90. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552F.3d at 318–19.
91. Id. at 319.
92. For a thorough discussion of the judicial role in screening expert testimony at the class
certification stage, see Marcus, supra note 77.
93. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.11 (1995). It is interesting to note that the
court in Hydrogen Peroxide cited that section of the Manual for the proposition that a court must make
all relevant inquiries and consider all relevant evidence and argument presented by the parties.
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307.
94. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.11 (1995).
95. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004)..
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(approximately eleven years after Daubert), gives guidance to judges
considering class certification motions:
Expert witnesses play a limited role in class certification hearings . . . .
The judge need not decide at the certification stage whether such expert
testimony satisfies standards for admissibility at trial. Courts have
applied a high threshold for assessing the need for expert testimony at the
certification stage. A judge should not be drawn prematurely into a battle
96
of competing experts.

For the first time, the MCL, 4th discussed the possibility that
expert witnesses testimony may be relevant to the class certification
decision but urged a cautious approach, expressly stated that the
judge ―need not decide at the certification stage‖ the admissibility of
such evidence and that courts should apply ―a high threshold for
assessing the need for expert testimony at the certification stage.‖
Four years later, the Hydrogen Peroxide court of appeals directed the
district court to examine and decide the admissibility of expert
evidence, at least to the extent that it was relevant to class
certification. How quickly seas change.
Without exploring this subject in detail, it appears that judicial
additions of an ascertainability requirement to Rule 23 have
increased pressure on class certification. Professor Miriam Gilles
documents the emergence of this phenomenon, and concludes:97
And yet that is the story of small-claims consumer class litigation over
the past decade, as federal district courts have repeatedly declined to
certify class actions on grounds that are specific to small-claims
consumer cases. Foremost among those grounds is the notion that the
federal class action rule carries within it an implicit requirement of
―ascertainability.‖ More specifically, courts have held that in order to
certify a class, the identity of class members must be sufficiently
ascertainable to ensure the efficacy of a subsequent distribution of
damages. In practice, what this shadow standard of ascertainability has
come to mean is that no matter how clear the evidence of wrongdoing,
plaintiffs have no redress in the typical consumer case involving small
98
retail transactions.

The Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, may have set the stage
for expansion of the concept of ascertainability in its repeated

96. Id. § 21.2, 267–68 (citing In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F. 3d 124,
135 (2d Cir. 2001) (―[A] district court may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in
‗statistical dueling‘ of experts‖ at the class certification stage.)).
97. Miriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility To Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 278, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499402.
98. Id. at 3–4.
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assertions that the class ―definition must be precise, objective, and
presently ascertainable‖ and that ―Rule 23(b)(3) actions require a
class definition that will permit identification of individual class
members.‖99 The FJC‘s ―Pocket Guide for Judges‖ echoes the same
guidance for judges in defining classes.100
Finally, the Supreme Court‘s decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart101
deserves some comment despite the fact that it did not apply during
the period of the studies discussed and could not have any direct
impact on any of the studies discussed below. The impact of the
Dukes decision is difficult to predict, but attempts to identify some of
the factors that might be involved in hypothesizing the direction of
class action filing and certification after Dukes seems instructive
about some of the factors that may already be in play. On its face,
the majority‘s holding in Dukes that allegations of nationwide gender
discrimination by a corporate entity with numerous stores, regional
offices, and decentralized personnel decision-making did not present
a single common issue of law or fact under Rule 23(a)(2) might be
seen as imposing a chokehold on filing and certification. According
to the dissent, this interpretation of Rule 23(a)(2), unsupported by the
findings of the district court, was ―far reaching‖ because the
approach would be applicable to (b)(1) and (b)(2) proposed classes as
well.102
Nonetheless, the dynamics of class action litigation and the
resourcefulness of class actions attorneys might shift the impact in a
different direction. Litigants might reframe their claims for filing
and certification in state courts that have more expansive
interpretations of class certification standards. Under the Supreme
Court‘s decision in Smith v. Bayer,103 states are free to interpret their
class action rules independently of federal interpretations of Rule 23.
Even in federal court, the Dukes decision might have little impact of
filing and certification because the case itself is an outlier and hence
distinguishable from a case that does not involve gender
discrimination claims on behalf of 1.5 million potential class
members allegedly harmed by millions of decisions made by
thousands of corporate managers in 3,400 stores spread among fifty
states. As these brief speculations suggest, abstract, rule-based class
certification standards are not the only factors driving the rate of
class certification. Even for the cases in which class certification is
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (2004).
Rothstein & Willging, supra note 49, at 9–10.
Dukes v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
Id. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
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litigated fully—a minority of those we have examined—litigants
retain options for working within and around the rules.
B. Prior Studies

In this subpart, we briefly compare the findings presented in Part I
to prior studies of class actions in the federal courts. There have been
very few empirical studies of class actions in general, and thus we are
limited to comparing and contrasting. With only five such studies,104
we cannot make any statements about trends.
First, let us describe briefly the contours of the other four studies.
1. Georgetown Study

Editors at the Georgetown Law Journal examined docket records
and case documents in all proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class actions filed
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
between July 1, 1966, and December 31, 1972. At the time of their
report in 1974, 81 of 120 cases were terminated.105
2. Federal Judicial Center Study 1

FJC researchers examined all cases filed as Rule 23 class actions
that had been terminated in four federal district courts (Northern
District of California (San Francisco), Southern District of Florida
(Miami), North District of Illinois (Chicago), and Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), for a total of 407 cases. Researchers
examined docket reports and case documents. The study included
diversity and federal question cases and encompassed all types of
Rule 23(b) actions.106
3. Federal Judicial Center Study 2

FJC researchers surveyed a sample of attorneys who represented
104. Another study examines certification in the context of class action litigation involving
insurance companies, but the study does not distinguish between certification for purposes of litigation
or settlement and therefore does not present findings that are comparable to the other five studies. See
NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., INSURANCE CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (2007).
105. Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1974).
106. Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule
23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (1996). The Federal Judicial Center
published an earlier version of the same study, with complete tables and figures. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS
ACTIONS
IN
FOUR
FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURTS
(1996),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$file/rule23.pdf.
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plaintiffs and defendants in diversity and federal question class
actions that had terminated between July 1, 1999, and December 31,
2002. There were 728 attorney responses in 621 of 1,418 cases in the
sample. The report was based entirely on attorney responses to the
FJC questionnaire.107
4. Federal Judicial Center Study 3108

FJC researchers examined electronic docket records in a sample of
254 diversity class actions filed in or removed to federal courts
between February 18, 2003, and February 17, 2005 that had
terminated at the time of the report in 2008. Of the 254 cases in the
original sample, 231 were terminated and the other 23 were
pending.109
The first column in Table 2 presents the percentage of proposed
class actions in each of the five studies in which one or more motions
to certify litigation class was filed.110 Note that cases examined in
the first three studies were litigated under the as soon as practicable
version of Rule 23(c)(1),111 while cases in the current study and FJC
Study 3 were litigated under the contemporary early practicable time
version of Rule 23. Thus, we conclude that the proportion of class
actions in which a motion was actually filed would be higher in the
earlier studies than in the later ones. The studies are consistent with
our guess. The 1992–1994 study observed the highest percentage of
cases in which motions to certify a litigation class were filed, with
more than two-thirds of cases identified as class actions with such a
motion. The much-earlier Georgetown study found 51% of cases
filed as class actions in the years immediately following the 1966
amendments included such a motion. In the last available study prior
to the rule change, the observed proportion was 43%. The two
studies post-amendment found lower proportions of cases with a
contested motion for class certification, in the range of 24% to 35%.

107. Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action
Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591 (2006). The Federal Judicial
Center published an earlier version of the same study. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS‘
CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (2005) [hereinafter FJC STUDY 2], available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/clact05.pdf/$file/clact05.pdf.
108. Preliminary Findings, supra note 12.
109. Id. at 215.
110. All of these studies, except FJC STUDY 2, supra note 107, were based on information
extracted from docket records in terminated cases. FJC STUDY 2 was based on based on attorney
responses to a questionnaire about a recently terminated case. The FJC Pre-CAFA study included a
small number of pending cases.
111. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (regarding 2003 amendments).
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Although we cannot say that the differences in the studies represent a
change due to the amendment itself, the observations are not
inconsistent with the assertion that moving the decision to certify a
class to later in the case results in a lower proportion of cases with a
motion. Motions to certify continue to be litigated in a substantial
percentage of class action cases, but probably not as frequently as in
prior decades.
The second column in Table 2 shows the percentage of class
settlements in each study that occurred after the certification of a
litigation class. The denominator, in other words, is the total number
of class settlements, not the number of class actions filed. In the first
two studies, 89% and 61%, respectively, of the final settlements took
place after certification of a litigation class. In the current study,
twelve of 35 settlements in the removed cases (34%) and thirty-five
of 76 settlements in cases filed originally in federal court (46%)
occurred in cases in which the court had previously certified a
litigation class. In the pre-CAFA diversity class actions, the
comparable proportion was 20%, and in the 1999–2002 FJC survey,
the proportion was 42%. Interestingly, these last three studies, while
hardly presenting a united front, suggest that the importance of the
certification of a litigation class has waned in terms of being a
precondition of class settlement.
In the era immediately following the 1966 amendments, it is very
likely that the litigation class was the stock item and the settlement
class was the rare bird. Though settlement classes became more
acceptable by the 1990s, a majority of settlements were preceded by
certification of litigation classes. In the modern era, roughly the last
decade, fewer than half of the settlements completed the litigation
class process.112 Yet, as discussed above, certification as a litigation
class does not necessarily guarantee a class settlement. The third
column in Table 2 shows the percentage of certified litigation classes
in each study that resulted in a class settlement. In the current study,
25% of the removed cases certified as classes and 42% of the original
proceedings so certified did not result in a class settlement. Before
empirical studies clarified the point, the conventional wisdom was
that all certified class actions settled. In the 1994 FJC study, FJC
researchers found that certified class actions that survived motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment generally settled. In the
study based on 1999–2002 data, FJC researchers concluded, ―almost
all certified class actions settle.‖113 Our current study shows similar
112. Note again that the pre-CAFA study presents preliminary information that may change as
cases pending at the time of the study result in settlement. See supra text accompanying note 109.
113. Willging & Wheatman, supra note 107, at 32.
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results for federal question cases removed from state courts (75%),
but a lower percentage (58%) of original proceedings with certified
classes leading to a class settlement. The latter percentage represents
the low point of the four studies that considered the relationship
between certification of a litigation and eventual settlement. In other
words, as we show, certified classes may yet end up being dismissed
on motion, decertified, or reversed on appeal.
CONCLUSION

The obvious question is, what do the findings presented in this
paper tell policymakers—which in this context includes the Supreme
Court, committees of the Judicial Conference and the Congress—
about the present state of the class action in the federal courts? At a
minimum, these findings suggest that, despite many of the changes in
the law of the class action outlined in Part II, class actions are still
being filed and, more significantly, classes are still being certified in
the federal courts. A relatively small percentage of proposed class
actions result in class settlement. Certification of a litigation class
often means class settlement; but the findings presented in Part I
should remind everyone that the certification of a litigation class does
not, in every case, end the litigation. The lack of comparable studies
over the last four decades makes it impossible to do more than
speculate about trends. But these findings invite the speculation,
however, that there has been a decline in class certification.114 There
is much room for additional research into class actions.
But to a great extent, class actions are a moving target for research.
The Supreme Court continues to decide important cases in this area.
The lower courts continue to apply these new precedents and to
interpret CAFA. There has been at least one congressional hearing
on class actions this year (in 2012).115 And, notably, the Civil Rules
Committee has placed class actions back on its agenda. The January
2012 Standing Committee meeting featured a panel discussion of
class actions,116 and the topic was discussed at length at the March
114. Cf. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038985 (citing similar developments in the legal environment and
concluding that, in many areas, the class action is no longer viable).
115. The hearing, before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Constitution, was
held June 1, 2012. See Hearing on: Class Action Seven Years After the Class Action Fairness Act,
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Hearings%202012/hear_06012012.html
(last visited June 8, 2012).
116. Agenda, COMMITTEE ON RULES PRAC. & PROC. 227 (Jan. 5–6, 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST201201.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks.
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2012 meeting of the Civil Rules Committee.117 It is anyone's guess
what direction these renewed discussions will take. But what is clear
is that the subject is not going to go away. The class actions wars
continue.

117. Agenda, COMMITTEE ON RULES PRAC. & PROC. 449 (Mar. 22–33, 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2012-03.pdf.
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TABLE 1: CASE PROCESSING TIMES
Category
Original proceedings
Class settlements
Not class settlements
Removals
Remands
Class settlements
Not class settlements

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss2/3

Median (months)

N

20.9
9.3

71
352

3.7
24.6
9.9

95
32
35

30
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TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF CLASS ACTION STUDIES
Study

Georgetown Study—
1966–72
FJC Study—
1992–94
FJC Study 2—
1999–2002
FJC Pre-CAFA Study—
2003–05
Present Study—
2003–07

Percentage of cases
with
motion
to
certify a litigation
class
51

Certified
litigation Percentage of certified
classes as a percentage litigation
classes
of class settlements
resulting
in
class
settlement
89
–

70

61

43

42

62, 71,
88, 100
77

24

20

100

31, 35

34, 46

58, 75
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FIGURE 2
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